Editor’s Note: This article was originally published in Turkish by Tamga Türk and translated into English by the Center for Uyghur Studies (CUS).
“Etli tırñaklı eyirmes.”
“Flesh cannot be separated from the fingernail.”
— Mahmud al-Kashgari, Dīwān Lughāt al-Turk (Compendium of the Languages of the Turks)
In Turkic communities, a simple yet profound proverb expresses how familial bonds and brotherhood form an inseparable whole. In just three words, this saying captures the essence of a bond that should be unbreakable: “Flesh cannot be separated from the nail.” This sentiment belongs to Mahmud al-Kashgari, a preeminent scholar of the Turkic-Islamic world from East Turkistan. Its original Uyghur form, “Etli tırñaklı eyirmes,” describes a foundational unity. However, we are now witnessing a period in which this bond and the very meaning of the proverb, is being systematically dismantled.
Since the early 1990s, cultural and political frameworks such as the International Organization of Turkic Culture (TRKSOY) and the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) have positioned themselves as guardians of the “Turkic world.” Yet, a closer look at their membership and activities reveals a glaring omission: East Turkistan. Despite being the birthplace of al-Kashgari and the cradle of the oldest written Turkic sources, the region and its indigenous Uyghur people are systematically excluded. Within these organizations, established to foster solidarity, there is a striking absence of initiatives supporting the Uyghur language or people. It appears al-Kashgari’s wisdom has been discarded; the flesh has indeed been separated from the nail, sacrificed for the sake of economic and diplomatic expediency.
The international organizations founded to institutionalize the cultural unity of the Turkic world claim, in their founding documents and rhetoric, to encompass “the whole of the Turkic-speaking peoples.” The International Organization of Turkic Culture (TÜRKSOY) describes itself as “the first cooperation organization established in the Turkic world” and has taken on the mission of promoting cultural heritage and strengthening interaction among languages (1). This mission takes concrete form each year through the practice of naming a “Turkic World Cultural Capital,” a title that fourteen different cities, from Astana to Andijan, have held (2).
This claim of inclusiveness reaches a hard limit at the border of East Turkistan. Kashgar remains one of the historically vital intellectual centers of the Turkic world; it is where al-Kashgari was born and where he completed Dīwān Lughāt al-Turk (The Compendium of the Languages of the Turks), the first comprehensive dictionary of the Turkic language (3). Nevertheless, neither TRKSOY nor the OTS includes the Uyghur homeland in its lists of members, observers, or cultural capitals. The very people who are the living, breathing keepers of this heritage are rendered invisible by the institutions that claim to protect it.
The proverb “Etli tırñaklı eyirmes,” compiled by Mahmud al-Kashgari in the 11th century, conveys that flesh cannot be torn from the fingernail, and that the bond between kin and kinsmen should be equally unbreakable. Another saying found in the same compilation, “Tag tagka kavuşmas, kişi kişige kavuşur” (mountains do not meet mountains, but people meet people) expresses the belief that geographic obstacles, the mountains standing in between, cannot ultimately break human bonds (4). Yet today, when one looks at the institutional map of the Turkic world, one sees a picture that is precisely the reverse of these two proverbs: flesh has been separated from the fingernail, and East Turkistan, caught between the mountains, has not been drawn closer as people are meant to be, but has instead been kept at a distance from these institutions. The land where Mahmud al-Kashgari himself was born, where he compiled his work, and to which he returned at the end of his life, does not appear on the map of the institutions that today celebrate his legacy as “the shared treasure of the Turkic world.” The central question of this report arises precisely from this point: How is it that flesh has become so separated from the nail that the Turkic world has, at the institutional level, grown so distant from the Uyghur people? The goal of this analysis is to seek an answer to this important question. Both the organizations in question and the diplomatic and economic reasons behind this exclusion will be examined.
At this point, the first organization to look at is the International Organization of Turkic Culture (TÜRKSOY), because TÜRKSOY’s activities are, in terms of visibility, ahead of the other organizations. TÜRKSOY was established through an agreement signed in Almaty on July 12, 1993, by the ministers of culture of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Turkiye (1). The organization’s origins go back to meetings held in Baku and Istanbul in 1992, at which the culture ministers of the same six countries declared their commitment to cooperate within a shared cultural framework. As of today, TÜRKSOY has six founding members and eight regions with observer status: the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, together with the Republics of Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Altai, Sakha (Yakutia), Tuva, and Khakassia – all part of the Russian Federation – and Gagauzia, part of Moldova (1).
One of TÜRKSOY’s principal activities is the Turkic World Cultural Capital program, in place since 2012. The cities named so far are as follows: Astana (2012), Eskişehir (2013), Kazan (2014), Merv (2015), Şeki (2016), Turkistan (2017), Kastamonu (2018), Osh (2019), Khiva (2020), Bursa (2022), Shusha (2023), Anev (2024), Aktau (2025), and Andijan (2026) (2). Not one of the fourteen cities selected over these fourteen years of the program lies within the Uyghur region. Neither Kashgar, nor Urumqi, nor Hotan, nor Turpan appears on this list.
Alongside TÜRKSOY, there are other structures that institutionalize cooperation within the Turkic world and rest on the same core membership base. The umbrella organization founded in 2009 under the name “Cooperation Council of Turkic-Speaking States” (Turkic Council), which took the name “Organization of Turkic States” (OTS) at the Istanbul Summit in November 2021, has Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkiye as full members, and Hungary, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, and Turkmenistan as observers (5). TÜRKSOY, mentioned above, later became one of OTS’s affiliated organizations. Other organizations under the same umbrella include the Turkic Council of Parliamentary Assembly (TÜRKPA), the International Turkic Academy, the Turkic Culture and Heritage Foundation, and the Turkic States Joint Chamber of Commerce and Industry (5). Although each of these institutions operates in a different functional area (parliamentary diplomacy, academic research, cultural heritage), their membership and observer maps repeat the same core roster of six or seven states. The relevant ones among these institutions will also be briefly addressed here.
The Turkic States Parliamentary Assembly (TÜRKPA) was established through a treaty signed on November 21, 2008, at Dolmabahçe Palace in Istanbul by the speakers of parliament of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkiye (6). Following its establishment, at the first general assembly meeting held in Baku on September 29, 2009, TÜRKPA’s internal statute, the regulations of its Secretariat, and the Baku Declaration were adopted, and it was decided that the permanent headquarters of the Secretariat would be Baku (6). The institution’s two observer-status members are Hungary and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus; Uzbekistan since the end of 2017 and Turkmenistan since 2020 have attended TÜRKPA meetings only as “guests,” without gaining full membership or observer status. After the Turkic Council took the name “Organization of Turkic States” in November 2021, TÜRKPA, at its 11th General Assembly Meeting in 2022, changed its name from “Parliamentary Assembly of Turkic-Speaking Countries” to “Turkic States Parliamentary Assembly,” while retaining its abbreviation (TÜRKPA). Among the institution’s core objectives are strengthening bonds among member states through parliamentary diplomacy, developing political-legal-economic cooperation, and advancing social-cultural relations (6). Despite a history spanning more than seventeen years, none of TÜRKPA’s lists of members, observers, or guests has ever included the Uyghur region or any representative body of that region; this shows that the exclusion of Uyghur Turks from political representation at the nation-state level is also reflected at the level of inter-parliamentary cooperation.
The idea of founding the International Turkic Academy, one of the organizations affiliated with OTS, was first proposed by Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev at the IX Summit of Heads of Turkic-Speaking States held in Nakhchivan on October 3, 2009. The Academy was established on May 25, 2010, at the Palace of Peace and Reconciliation in Astana, initially under the name “Turkic Academy,” affiliated with Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Education and Science (7); its opening was attended by Nazarbayev and then-Turkish President Abdullah Gül, as well as Turkologists from the United States, Turkic communities in Russia (Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Chuvashia, Yakutia), Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Ukraine. At the 2nd Summit of the Turkic Council held in Bishkek on August 23, 2012, the Academy was granted international status through an agreement signed by Nazarbayev, Gül, Kyrgyz President Almazbek Atambayev, and Azerbaijani Prime Minister Artur Rasizade; this status entered into force on November 11, 2014, through Kazakhstan’s ratification law dated October 15, 2014 (8). The Academy’s full members are Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkiye; Hungary gained observer status at the 6th Summit in Cholpon-Ata in 2018. Uzbekistan gained observer status at the 2022 Samarkand Summit. The institution operates five research centers – in history-ethnology, language-literature-terminology, art-culture, socio-economic studies, and international studies – and runs a Turkology library holding more than 32,000 works. Between 2013 and 2020 the Academy published the journal “Altaistics, Turkology and Mongolistics”; between 2014 and 2021, the journal “Global-Turk”; and between 2015 and 2022, the bulletin “Turkic Weekly.” In 2023 it completed joint textbook projects titled “Common Turkic History,” “Common Turkic Literature,” and “Geography of the Turkic World.” Although the Academy’s mission is defined as “assessing the contributions of Turkic civilization to human civilization based on indigenous sources,” the scope of this assessment remains confined to the same six or seven states. No Uyghur institution – representing the present-day political voice of the geography where Mahmud al-Kashgari was born and where he compiled Dīwān Lughāt al-Turk – appears anywhere in the Academy’s lists of members, observers, or partners. Today, a search for the word “Uyghur” on the Academy’s website produces exactly one link. That single link is a news item about a photo exhibition organized by the Chinese embassy marking the 70th anniversary of the so-called Uyghur Autonomous Region – the name China declared after occupying East Turkistan (10). A search using the English spelling turns up four links in total, of which only two even mention the word “Uyghur.” The absence of any work concerning the Uyghur people within this international academic organization of the Turkic world is a lamentable state of affairs.
Mahmud al-Kashgari exists, but the Uyghurs do not!
Another organization worth examining is the Turkic Culture and Heritage Foundation, which was first established independently and later joined OTS (11). The Foundation was created on the initiative of the President of Azerbaijan and with the support of the presidents of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkiye; its charter was adopted at the Turkic Council Summit in Bishkek on August 23, 2012. Headquartered in Baku, the Foundation signed a host-country agreement with the Azerbaijani government on November 8, 2018, and its administrative building was opened as part of the Turkic Council’s Baku Summit on October 14, 2019; at the same summit, Hungary joined the Foundation with observer-country status. The Foundation’s full members are Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkiye. Uzbekistan became a member of the Foundation in 2025 (12). The Foundation’s current president, Aktoty Raimkulova, reported in the 2024 activity report that more than 74 projects and events had been carried out, including the restoration of the Alykul Osmonov house-museum in Bishkek, the Catalogue of Turkic Cultural Heritage prepared within the framework of the “Vision of the Turkic World – 2040” document, support for the 5th World Nomad Games, and the book series “Outstanding Figures of the Turkic World,” “Pearls of Turkic Literature,” and “Scientific Treasures of the Turkic World” (13). Particularly notable in this context is that the Foundation organized an international scholarly conference and exhibition at UNESCO headquarters in Paris to mark the 950th anniversary of Mahmud al-Kashgari’s Dīwān Lughāt al-Turk (13). Here is an institution that commemorates, at UNESCO in Paris, the author of the founding text of the Turkic language, while including, through no membership, observer status, or representation whatsoever, the present-day people of the very geography where that work was born, the Uyghur Turks. This contradiction concretely illustrates the central thesis of this article: while Mahmud al-Kashgari is embraced at the symbolic-cultural level, no door whatsoever is opened, at the political-institutional level, to the Uyghur community that is the living bearer of this heritage.
Looking at the member states of the organizations mentioned above, and at the guests and observers who take part in their activities, it becomes clear that not a single event has ever included an invited Uyghur academic, Uyghur linguist, Uyghur opinion leader, or any individual representing the Uyghur region. This picture demonstrates that the exclusion is not a matter of “missing information” or “institutional immaturity,” but rather a systematic practice of exclusion that has been consistently repeated for more than thirty years across five different institutions, established at different times and operating in different functional areas. Indeed, while autonomous republics affiliated with the Russian Federation, with populations not exceeding a few hundred thousand – Khakassia, for instance, with a population of roughly 500,000 – can attain observer status, the Uyghur population, numbering around 20 million, has never translated into any form of representation at all.
The main reason for the exclusion: the China factor
So what is the reason behind the exclusion of the Uyghur people from the organizations of the other Turkic communities to such a degree? To understand this question, the first place to look is Turkiye, because historically it has been the strongest country to which not only the Uyghurs but all Turkic communities have felt bound. Turkiye’s historical stance on the Uyghur issue, however, has undergone a marked transformation over time. In the process examined by researcher Yitzhak Sichor through the concept of “ethno-diplomacy,” Turkiye, until the mid-1990s, served as a source of ideological inspiration for Uyghur nationalism, granted asylum rights to Uyghur refugees, and provided material and moral support to Uyghur organizations (14).
The present-day repercussions of this transformation have also been documented. According to a Human Rights Watch report from November 2025, since Turkiye-China relations began to revive in 2022, Uyghurs living in Turkiye have periodically started encountering various difficulties (15). An October 2025 analysis by BBC Turkish likewise shows that after President Erdoğan, in 2009, described the policies in the Uyghur region as “savagery” and “genocide,” the deepening of Turkiye-China economic relations has been accompanied by a marked shift of official rhetoric toward a noticeably more cautious line (16).
China’s influence over the Uyghur diaspora is felt not only at the official level but also directly at the level of the community itself. Research prepared on this subject shows that Chinese intelligence services monitor diaspora communities, infiltrate organizations, and drive these communities toward “paralysis and passivity” in countries with large Uyghur populations, including Turkiye (17). Likewise, it has been documented through research that China, via its embassy and consular staff, pressures Uyghurs in Turkiye into gathering information by threatening them through family members who remain in their homeland (18).
China’s regional influence is a dynamic that extends not only to Turkiye but also to the other member states of TÜRKSOY and OTS. The so-called “counter-terrorism” rhetoric developed within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation has led Central Asian states to adopt a cautious, even repressive, stance toward Uyghur communities and activism within their own borders; this shows that these states act out of a concern not to offend China. In this context, it can be said that all member states of TÜRKSOY and OTS converge on a shared interest in keeping the issue of East Turkistan off their agendas: none of them wishes to risk its economic and security relations with China.
The Erosion of Cultural Legitimacy
This picture creates a serious tension between the inclusive rhetoric TÜRKSOY and similar structures carry, with their claim to be the “UNESCO of the Turkic world,” and the reality on the ground. When an institution presents itself as representing the entirety of a language family and cultural basin, while systematically excluding the geography where that language’s oldest written source was born and the more than eleven million indigenous inhabitants of that geography, the institution’s claim to universality is undermined. This exclusion is not merely a symbolic shortcoming; it also produces a concrete consequence by hindering the international visibility of Uyghur language, literature, and cultural heritage. At the same time, the cause of this neglect is not the ill will or ignorance of the institutions, but a form of self-censorship imposed by the economic and strategic relations that member states maintain with China. This distinction matters for directing criticism at the right target: the issue is not the will of those who bear the name “Turkic communities organization,” but a broader geopolitical equation that encompasses them as well.
In a nutshell, this analysis has revealed the contradiction between the founding claims of the Turkic world’s cultural cooperation structures and their actual practice. Institutions such as TÜRKSOY and the Organization of Turkic States have claimed to represent the cultural unity of Turkic-speaking peoples for over thirty years. However, this claim loses its validity regarding East Turkistan and the Uyghur Turks. Historical examples like the Dīwān Lughāt al-Turk demonstrate the central place of this geography in Turkic culture, yet institutional maps fail to reflect this. Evidence suggests that this exclusion stems from regional pressure by China and the economic dependency of member states. This report aims to bring this legitimacy gap into public debate and make Uyghur cultural heritage visible through diaspora and civil society initiatives.
These findings represent more than an academic observation; they highlight a significant moral responsibility. This thirty-year silence is a conscious exclusion of the Uyghur people and the homeland of Mahmud al-Kashgari. As the bond between these communities is severed, the Turkic world’s claim to unity rings hollow. This stance, driven by transient political and economic calculations, will eventually face historical accountability. When the political landscape shifts, these institutions will be remembered for abandoning the Uyghurs in their hour of greatest need. Ending this institutional disregard is not just a moral choice; it is a prerequisite for these organizations to remain faithful to their own raison d’être.
References
1. TÜRKSOY, “History,” TÜRKSOY, https://www.turksoy.org/tarihce
2. TÜRKSOY, “Cultural Capitals,” TÜRKSOY, https://www.turksoy.org/kultur-baskentleri
3. Hürriyet, “Who Is Mahmud al-Kashgari? The Author of Dīwān Lughāt al-Turk,” Hürriyet, https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/kasgarli-mahmud-kimdir-divan-i-lugatit-turkun-yazari-40969847
4. Mahmud al-Kashgari, “Dīwān Lughāt al-Turk,” Turkish Language Association Publications, 1998, https://yenidenergenekon.com/7-divan-i-lugati’t-turk’te-atasozleri/
5. Organization of Turkic States, “Official Website,” Organization of Turkic States, https://turkicstates.org/tr
6. TÜRKPA, “About TÜRKPA,” TÜRKPA, https://turkpa.org/tr/about
7. International Turkic Academy, “About the Academy,” International Turkic Academy, https://turkicacademy.org/en/about/ob-akademii
8. Online Zakon.kz, “Agreement on the Establishment of the Turkic Academy,” Online Zakon.kz, 2012, https://online.zakon.kz/Document/?doc_id=31245170
9. Organization of Turkic States, “Turkic Academy – Partner Detail,” Organization of Turkic States, https://www.turkicstates.org/tr/partner-detay/turkic-academy-tr
10. Turkic Academy, “Photo Exhibition Commemorating the 70th Anniversary of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region,” Turkic Academy, 2025, https://turkicacademy.org/en/novost-akademii/turkic-academy-participated-opening-ceremony-photo-exhibition-commemorating-70th-anniversary-xinjiang-uygur-autonomous-region
11. Turkic Culture and Heritage Foundation, “Official Website,” Turkic Culture and Heritage Foundation, https://turkicheritage.org/tr
12. Turkic Culture and Heritage Foundation, “History,” Turkic Culture and Heritage Foundation, https://turkicheritage.org/tr/Home/History
13. TurkicWorld, “2nd Expert-Level Meeting at the Headquarters of the Turkic Culture and Heritage Foundation,” TurkicWorld, 2025, https://turkic.world/en/articles/other/327040
14. Yitzhak Sichor, “Ethno-Diplomacy: The Uyghur Hitch in Sino-Turkish Relations,” East-West Center, https://scholarspace.manoa.hawaii.edu/bitstreams/db86c9f0-5316-4175-aa8a-bcf781078ee8/download
15. Human Rights Watch, “Protected No More,” Human Rights Watch, 2025, https://www.hrw.org/report/2025/11/12/protected-no-more/uyghurs-in-turkiye
16. BBC Turkish, “Turkey-China Rapprochement: Has the Uyghur Issue Fallen Off the Agenda?,” BBC Turkish, 2025, https://www.bbc.com/turkce/articles/ckgywgxrg0po
17. Uyghur Human Rights Project, “The Fifth Poison: The Harassment of Uyghur Overseas,” Uyghur Human Rights Project, https://uhrp.org/report/the-fifth-poison-the-harassment-of-uyghur-overseas/
18. QHA, Crimean News Agency, “How Does China’s Pressure on Uyghur Turks Living in Turkey Work?,” QHA, 2023, https://www.qha.com.tr/ozel-haber-roportaj/cin-in-turkiye-de-yasayan-uygur-turkleri-uzerindeki-baskisi-nasil-isliyor-477189
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